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Abstract 
 
Cross-cultural negotiations are complex, challenging, and difficult to navigate because much of 
the Asian culture is unstated, implicit, and internalized in subtle behavioral patterns. It is like an 
iceberg; more is invisible and less is visible. To understand how the Asian negotiation values 
and practices are different from those in the West, I describe briefly the Asian cultural roots, 
highlight the major dimensions that differentiate cultures, explore the factors that influence the 
Asian negotiation processes and outcomes, and provide a list of practical suggestions for 
negotiating successful deals with Asian negotiators.     
 
Keywords: Negotiation, Culture, Multicultural Negotiation, Asia  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Asia’s recent rapid rise to economic prominence marks the beginning of a trend that will 
increase in the future. The Chinese economy, the second largest in the world, is currently 
attracting more direct investment than any other nation. Estimates suggest that by 2015 China’s 
purchasing power will surpass the U.S., and by 2025 China will be the world’s largest economic 
power. Similarly, India’s economic prominence in the global economy is also increasing. Today, 
India is the third most attractive foreign investment destination globally and is expected to be the 
world’s third-largest economy by 2035.  In 20 years, it is estimated that the combined 
economies of China, India, and Japan will dominant the global economy. 
Asia’s growing economic dominance, on one hand, and the continuous search for new 
business opportunities, on the other hand, will drive Western businesses to have stronger 
economic ties to Asia in various forms: joint ventures; wholly foreign-owned enterprises; or 
direct investments.    
Cultural values and business practices in Asia are different from those in the West. The 
challenge for Western businesses is to understand those values and find effective ways for 
operating successfully in Asia. This paper focuses specifically on negotiation in Asia. First, I 
describe briefly the cultural roots of China, Japan, and India. Second, I highlight the major 
dimensions that differentiate cultures. Third, I explore how  factors like relationships, trust, 
approach to the rule of law, fairness, “face,” risk aversion, time orientation, and emotions 
influence negotiation processes and outcomes. Fourth, I provide a list of practical suggestions 
for negotiating successful deals with Asian negotiators.     
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2. Cultural Roots 
 
Culture refers to the collective programming of the mind through socially transmitted values that 
shape the way people of the same social group think and act in various situations (Hofstede, 
1980), including in negotiation. To understand the Asians’ mind-set and negotiating style, one 
has to understand the influential cultural roots of Asia, primarily Confucianism, Taoism, Chinese 
stratagems (Art of War), Hinduism, and experiences with Western colonialism and imperialism.  
The Asian–Chinese culture is largely rooted in the teachings of Kong Fu Ze, known as 
Confucius, who lived in China from 551 to 479 B.C.  The Confucian doctrine is a pragmatic 
moral and non-religious ethic that advocates virtuous behavior such as, benevolence, 
righteousness, justice, propriety, trust, and sincerity. These moral ideals are designed to guide 
one’s daily life through a set of clear rules. The first rule is the stability of society.  Societal 
stability is based on five basic and unequal relationships, known as wu lun. The relationships 
are between ruler and subject, father and son, older brother and younger brother, husband and 
wife, and older friend and younger friend.  Second, family harmony is the prototype of all other 
social organizations. Family members are not autonomous to pursue their self-centered desires; 
they must restrain their impulses for the overall good of the family’s interests. Similarly, 
individual members in other social systems (groups, organizations and communities) should 
also submit to the interests of the collective.  By extension, a business joint venture, for 
example, should be run on the basis of the family model. The role of the joint venture, therefore, 
is to serve the interests of the parent company the same way a child faithfully serves the family. 
Third, Confucianism advocates virtuous behavior towards others. This consists of having good 
manners between civilized people who also have a sense of dignity and shame (“face”). Fourth 
is mastery. One’s challenge in life consists of self-improvement - the tenacity to acquire skills 
and education through hard work and perseverance. Individuals as well as collectives ought to 
use resources wisely, mainly preserving them for the future. Modest spending is virtuous 
whereas hedonism and conspicuous consumption are taboos. Other important values are 
respect for tradition and reciprocity of favors and gifts.  
Confucian humanity, based on the principles of harmony, hierarchy and sincerity, is 
applied primarily to insiders - family and kinship in group members. It is not a universal morality 
that must be applied to all in all circumstances because “he who treats his enemy with humanity 
and virtue only harms himself….Using the rhetoric of virtue to maintain a pretense to others…is 
acceptable” (von Senger, 1991, p.12).   
Next to the wide spread influence of Confucianism is the influence of Lao Tzu, the 
founder of the Taoist philosophy.  It advocates simplicity, contentment, spontaneity, and wu wei 
(inaction). The two key concepts of Taoism are yin and yang, and wu wei (Fang, 1999). The yin 
and yang are contrasts that complement each other and together create a harmonious whole. 
However, because life’s forces are not static, harmony is not permanent. When good changes 
to bad and fortune to misfortune, disharmony settles. Re-harmonization of the yin and the yang 
is, therefore, an ongoing process of mutual adjustment. Conflict, from the yin and yang 
perspective, is a manifestation of imbalance between two opposing forces that can be resolved 
by mutual readjustment.         
The Taoist principle of reversion – good changes to bad or fortune turns to misfortune - 
has profoundly shaped the Asian’s holistic mind-set that recognizes the co-existence of 
contrasts and sees them together as a harmonious whole. Reversion, therefore, encourages 
caution, resilience, and hopefulness, when fortune, for example, is not separated from 
misfortune. In times of prosperity, one must be cautious and observe frugality to buffer against 
possible misfortune and hardship. And in times of misfortune, one must be resilient and hopeful 
awaiting fortune.      
The principle of wu wei, translated into inaction, does not literally mean passivity and 
doing nothing. It means action less activity, to act without acting.  It is the art of “mastering 
circumstances without asserting ones self against them; it is the principle of yielding to an 
oncoming force in such a way that it is unable to harm you” (Fang, 1999, p.33).  It is an 
approach that accepts given circumstances as they are, not resisting, but instead, finding the 
best way within the given set of circumstances. It is the water way. Water is fluid and flexible 
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and does not resist. It adapts by finding new ways to continue to flow. The principles of yin and 
yang, and wu-wei, according to Fang (1999), form the foundation of the Chinese stratagems as 
described in the writings of the Art of War and the 36 Chinese stratagems. 
Another deeply embedded cultural root that influences Asian culture and negotiating 
style is the 2300 years old concept of Ji, or as it is known in the West, the Art of War developed 
by Sun Tzu, the Chinese military strategist. Ji means to plan, to create strategies or stratagems. 
Stratagems are not just simple acts involving trickery and deceit. Ji is both tactic and strategy, 
and a method of using “mental wisdom instead of physical force to win a war” (Fang, 1999, 
p.155).    
 The business arena, from the perspective of Ji (Art of War), is viewed as a competitive 
battlefield. To win over the unworthy competitor-enemy, one must use the morally justified 
stratagems, such as secrecy, deception, and espionage.    
 The militant concept of Ji was further emphasized by the Thirty-Six Stratagems written 
by an anonymous Chinese writer (Fang, 1999, p.164). Some of the 36 stratagems are: Hide a 
knife in a smile, which means win the opponent’s trust and act after his guard is down; Kill with a 
borrowed knife, which means make use of others’ resources for your gain; The beautiful woman 
which means use temptations and espionage to overpower the enemy; and Lure the tiger to 
leave the mountains, which means draw the opponent out of his natural environment to cut him 
from his source of power.  
 The Chinese stratagems have been widely disseminated through the popular literature 
and over time have penetrated deeply into the Asian’s cultural ethos. When Japan was 
introduced to the Art of War about 1500 years ago, it was studied immediately by generals. To 
this day, Chinese managers are encouraged to read and use the Chinese stratagems “for the 
purpose of winning business in competition with foreign business people” (Fang, 1999, p.180).  
The Asian Chinese character was formed by Confucianism, which advocates humanity 
and righteousness; by Taoism, which emphasizes yin and yang, and wu wei (wisdom of 
inaction); and by the militant principles of the Art of War and the 36 Chinese stratagems that 
advocate the use of military-like strategies to subdue the enemy and win the war. The long 
exposure to these different teachings has made the Asian Chinese practical and morally 
flexible. They use multiple standards and apply them contextually – based on specific situations 
and circumstances - without having a sense of acting immorally. This ability to act situationally is 
the key to understanding the complexity of Asian Chinese business negotiations (Fang, 1999).   
Over time, the Confucian philosophy extended its influence from China to Japan and 
Korea. The Japanese culture also emphasizes hierarchical relationships, restraining one’s self-
interests, and promoting social and interpersonal harmony. It is the responsibility of all 
members, including leaders, to maintain and promote social harmony. To preserve harmony, for 
example, Japanese negotiators refrain from competing amongst themselves. They measure 
successes by how much an individual is contributing to the collective effort to become 
successful.  
The Indian culture is religiously and linguistically diverse (18 official languages and 
1600 dialects). It was shaped largely by the more than 5000 year old Hinduism and 3000 year 
old Buddhism that permeate all aspects of life. Hindus believe that humans are subject to a long 
series of reincarnations that ultimately, through good deeds (karma), end the cycle of re-births 
and achieve spiritual salvation. In the sequence of rebirths, one’s lifetime is temporary, and 
multiple lives are, therefore, an ongoing evolutionary process. Nothing is fixed, and nothing is 
permanent.     
Fundamentally, Indians believe that human nature is bad, immoral, and cannot be 
changed in one’s lifetime. Thus, people should be monitored and controlled through 
punishments. However, not all individuals are equally bad. Individuals born into the higher and 
noble caste of the Brahmins – priests, poets, and intellectuals -- are endowed with better 
personality traits than the inferior individuals born into the lower caste of laborers, the Shudras. 
Social hierarchy that structures inequality and promotes the stability of the existing order is 
deeply embedded in Indian history and culture. The fatalistic disposition of being born into a 
caste and the attitude that the future cannot be changed discourages one from taking initiatives 
and promoting change. These old historical and cultural forces are now changing in modern 
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India. And with the exposure to the forces of modernization and to the West, personal mastery, 
initiative, innovation, and change are encouraged.   
 
3. Recent History: The Dark Side of Foreigners 
 
The Asian culture is fundamentally a low-trust culture (Fukuyama, 1995). Secrecy and 
withholding of information are common, especially toward foreigners. Historically, foreigners 
came to China and before the Court of the Emperor as requestors - asking for something 
(Faure, 1998). But in recent history, foreigners – the colonialists and the imperialists - came to 
Asia as takers. They used their military superiority to control and exploit. Britain, for example, 
colonized India and attacked China in the first Opium War from 1839 to 1842 to force China to 
import British Opium. The defeated Chinese were forced to sign The Treaty of Nanjing where 
they had to commit to fixed tariffs of British goods, cede the island of Hong Kong to Queen 
Victoria, and pay reparation for the cost of the war to the British government. The British victory 
paved the way to resuming illegal drug trafficking within China. China, rejecting British pressure 
to legalize the opium trade in China, had to defend itself again in the Second Opium War, from 
1856 to 1860. In 1860 joint British and French forces attacked Beijing, burned down the 
Summer Palace and smashed its treasures. China, weakened by two wars, could no longer 
resist the pressure to legalize the trade of opium. “Beyond any doubt, by 1860 the ancient 
civilization that was China had been thoroughly defeated and humiliated by the West” (Hsu, 
2000, p.219). 
Ancient civilizations, like the Japanese and the Chinese, have a profound sense of the 
past. The Chinese, for example, regularly remind foreign negotiators of “the opium wars of the 
nineteen century” (Cohen, 2002, p.36). The resentful negative sentiments toward foreigners 
were expressed in the strong words of the former Chinese Premier, Mao: “The imperialists will 
never lay down their butcher knives, and they will never become Buddha ‘til their doom” 
(Blackman, 1997, p.25).   
The legacy of foreigners in Asia is dark. They have been seen as dangerous, exploitive, 
unethical, and untrustworthy. The new and modern form of joint ventures, for many Chinese, is 
just another exploitive method designed by the rich capitalists to get richer. In their view, rich 
foreigners build factories and operate mines and banks to control the economy.  Still, to this 
day, Indian and Japanese negotiators are conscious “of the racist and imperialist outrages to 
which their countries were subjected in the colonial era” (Cohen, 2002, p.36). Indians, known to 
be the most nationalistic people, are extremely sensitive to economic activities by foreigners, 
especially investments that will affect India’s future welfare.  
 
4. Cultural Dimensions 
 
The Asian culture is primarily rooted in the Confucian, Taoist, and Hindu philosophies. The 
central tenets of these philosophies have been synthesized into a number of cultural 
dimensions that differentiate between eastern and Western societies. The major cultural 
differentiators are: Individualism versus collectivism; Power distance; Uncertainty avoidance; 
Femininity versus masculinity (Hofstede, 1980); Confucian dynamism (Hofstede and Bond, 
1988); High versus low context; and the concept of time  -- Monochromic versus Polychromic 
(Hall, 1973).   
 
4.1. Individualism - Collectivism 
 
This dimension refers to the extent to which a society recognizes an individual’s right to pursue 
his personal goals. Individualistic societies like the United States, Great Britain, Canada, and 
Australia, are imbued with each citizen’s legal rights. People are concerned, primarily, about 
their own self-directed goals, needs, and interests. In contrast, collective societies like, China, 
Japan, Korea, and Singapore emphasize collective goals over individual goals and encourage 
self-sacrifice for the good of the whole. Self-interested behavior is discouraged and is perceived 
as selfish. A person’s duty is to conform and contribute to the common good of the group that 
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he is embedded in – the family, group, organization, and community. Social relationships tend to 
be permanent and people are more likely to keep their social relationships and affiliations 
(alumni, friends from military service) for a long period of their lives (Hui, 1990). Success in a 
collective culture is defined in terms of an individual’s commitment and effort to help the group 
achieve its goal.  
 
4.2. Power Distance 
 
This refers to the degree to which power is distributed equally across social groups. In high 
power distance – hierarchical cultures like, China, Japan, and India -- the less powerful 
members expect and accept that power will be distributed unequally. Positional power and 
social status are stressed and interpersonal relationships are vertical - based on differences of 
stature, age, gender, and education. The less powerful members of the social group typically 
refrain from expressing their opinion and suppress their contrarian views. Rarely, if ever, do they 
challenge high authority or take personal responsibility to make decisions. In low power distance 
– egalitarian-oriented cultures like the United States and the United Kingdom - rank, status, 
gender, and seniority, although recognized, are less emphasized. Knowledge, competency, and 
independence are valued. In China, for example, when seniority and competence are 
incongruent, the Chinese will choose the experience of the elders over competency.     
 
4.3. Uncertainty Avoidance  
 
This refers to the extent to which individuals feel comfortable (or uncomfortable) in ambiguous 
and unstructured situations. Uncertainty represents risk; certainty represents no risk. In high 
uncertainty avoidance societies like Japan and China, individuals prefer to operate in 
environments that are less risky, more clear and defined. Asians, in general, are risk averse and 
make decisions after careful evaluation of a large amount of information. Change is carefully 
measured, slow, and incremental. In contrast, in low uncertainty avoidance cultures like Israel 
and Canada, individuals are comfortable in fuzzy and unclear situations. They make quick 
decisions based on a limited amount of information, embrace change, and accept bold ideas.  
 
4.4. Femininity - Masculinity  
 
This refers to the extent to which the characteristics of the social group are more stereotypically 
feminine or masculine. On the masculinity-femininity continuum, Asian cultures are 
characterized as feminine. They are concerned with people’s feelings and emphasize harmony 
and cooperation. Western cultures are seen as masculine and achievement oriented because 
they emphasize competitiveness and assertiveness. 
 
4.5. Confucian Dynamism (Future Orientation) 
 
This dimension is related to the importance of the future and hard work. Long-term goals are 
achieved through persistence and perseverance, especially in the face of difficulties. The Asian-
Chinese culture is future oriented, emphasizes thrift, the conservation of resources, and 
investment for the future. In contrast, the time orientation of Western societies is short. 
Immediate gratification and quick results are sought and encouraged. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that the personal savings of the Chinese and Japanese are 26 and 22 percent of 
personal income, respectively, whereas the personal saving of Americans is only nine percent.  
 
4.6. High Context - Low Context 
 
This dimension refers to how people communicate. In China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, 
and Korea, known as high context cultures, communication is indirect, implicit, suggestive, and 
vague. This form of communication, says Bryan Huang, the President of Bearing Point Greater 
China confuses “almost all Americans and Europeans when they first visit Japan and China. 
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Western culture places a high value on being very specific. But in Japan and China, says Bryan 
Huang, “things are more ambiguous, on purpose” (Fernandez and Underwood, 2006, p.83). An 
American executive commenting on his business experience in Japan said: “I make deals all 
over the world. Everywhere I go, I can pretty much tell where I stand with my clients. 
Everywhere, that is except Japan” (Graham, 1986, p.65). 
Asians believe that the indirect way is the virtuous way to maintain harmony and “face.” 
According to a Chinese proverb, only the devil walks in a straight line.    
Although the Asian form of communication is indirect, it is complete. To uncover the 
complete information, however, you must look everywhere - in the message, in between the 
lines, in the facial expression and the body language, and in what is not being said. For Israelis, 
Americans, and Canadians, who communicate explicitly, this form of communication is 
mysterious and difficult to interpret.  
 
4.7. Temporal Orientation: Monochronic – Polychronic 
  
Asians have a polychronic attitude towards time. Time is fluid, cyclical, recursive and natural like 
the seasons. As in nature, where the seasons have their natural rhythms, human interactions 
also follow a natural flow of time. One, therefore, should naturally blend into the pace of events 
and allow time to take its course. Time should not restrict the process flow of human interaction. 
Human interaction should not be forced into pre-set, artificial schedules and plans.    
The Westerner’s temporal orientation is monochronic -- time is linear, inflexible, and 
sequential. The schedule for Americans “is almost sacred” (Hall, 1973, p.157). It is a limited 
resource that should be managed well and maximized. Fixed schedules, segmentation of time, 
promptness, performance schedules, and deadlines are emphasized.      
Edward Hall, a linguistic scholar, suggests that American negotiators prefer a pre-
determined and sequential agenda where the movement is linear from one issue to the next. 
They lose their balance when their counterpart negotiator changes the structure of the agenda 
by rearranging the sequence of the issues (1973). Asian negotiators have greater facility with a 
“messy” and less structured agenda. They easily move cyclically between issues and can 
handle multiple issues in parallel.  
 
5. Culture and Negotiation 
 
Research and experience have shown that culture influences negotiators’ mind-sets, behaviors, 
and styles. In this section, I describe how cultural differentiators (e.g., collectivism, high power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, Confucian dynamism, and high context) and cultural elements 
such as, distinction between in group and out-group, relationships, trust, legal framework, 
fairness, risk behavior, “face,” time perspective, emotions, decisions style, and teamwork  
influence the negotiation style of Asian negotiators.    
In-Group and Out-Group. 
In the Asian strong familial system, there is a distinction between the family and kinship 
social network - the in-group system - and outsider and strangers in the out-group system. In 
Japan, for example, there are three differentiating circles. The innermost circle, the Miuchi, 
comprises of trusted family and close friends. The Nakama, refers to friends and relatives who 
are mutually dependent on assistance. The most outer circle is the Tanin. It refers to strangers 
with whom there are no relationships.    
The behavioral norms in the in-group system are different from those in an out-group 
system.  In the in-group, members are seen as long-term trusted family and friends on whom 
you can rely and with whom you must collaborate rather than compete. Keeping interpersonal 
harmony in the in-group is a duty, but with members in the out-group, who are naturally not 
trusted, self-interested competitive behavior is acceptable. One need not be concerned with 
maintaining harmony and solidarity, especially with out-group exploitive foreigners.  
The distinction between the in-group and the out-group has a profound impact on 
Asians’ moral and social behavior, including negotiation. It affects the nature of relationships, 
trust, openness, sincerity, and commitment that shape the Asians’ negotiating style.  
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5.1. Negotiation Style 
 
Negotiators may come to the table with two distinctly different motivations: claiming value and 
creating value (Lax and Sebenius, 1986).  Negotiators with a value claiming attitude see the 
negotiation as a zero-sum game and a conquest. Value claiming negotiators conceal their 
interests, do not share information, bluff, exaggerate the value of their concessions, and use 
hard tactics like threats and ultimatums. In contrast, negotiators with a value creation attitude 
exchange information more openly, disclose their interests, invest in building relationships, 
nurture trust, and search for mutually beneficial options designed to create a win-win outcome.    
The true nature of negotiation, however, is mixed-motive, a combination of creating 
value followed by claiming value – a continuous process of cooperation and competition. 
Effective negotiators cooperate in order to create value and then move competitively to claiming 
value for themselves.  
The Asian Chinese negotiating style is rooted in the duality of the Confucian teaching of 
cooperation and the Chinese competitive stratagems (Fang, 1999). It is, as Guy Faure 
describes, a joint quest of working together, on one hand, and a ruthless mobile warfare, on the 
other hand (1998: 140). When counterpart negotiators are seen as adversaries and their 
interests are perceived to be in conflict, the mobile warfare style is used – the application of the 
military principles of the Art of War and the 36 Chinese stratagems. The primary objective of 
mobile warfare is to exhaust, destabilize, and weaken the adversary by various means, 
including concealment, deception, and espionage.  A mobile warfare negotiator will not hesitate 
to disseminate false information and misrepresent the facts in order to mislead. Asian Chinese 
negotiators often increase their bargaining edge by stimulating open competition between 
competing suppliers who are aware of each other. It is also not uncommon to intentionally leak 
a competitor’s proposal to the other competitors in order to pressure them to improve their 
proposals. The objective of mobile warfare, however, is not to completely destroy the other side. 
Rather, it is to weaken the adversary.  In negotiation it means reducing substantially the 
bargaining power of the other side. The Chinese who have used the mobile warfare strategy are 
known as tough, shrewd, and tenacious negotiators. They are skilled in extracting sizeable 
concessions and give concessions only after a long fight while creating an appearance of 
mutuality, reciprocity, and generosity.  
The joint quest, in contrast to the mobile warfare, is a collaborative and ambiguous 
process of searching patiently for mutual value through fairness. It is a harmonious process of 
value creation that can be achieved not by presenting bluntly opposing positions or by 
extracting concessions, but rather by engaging in delicate “dance,” of adjusting interests without 
explicitly disclosing the opposing interests. It is an invisible, subtle, and refined process of 
exchanges which makes Western negotiators often stumble like new dancers dancing in the 
dark.     
The duality of the mobile warfare and the joint quest is expressed in the Japanese word 
of negotiation. One meaning of negotiation is kosho.  It implies conflict of interests, verbal 
debate, fight, and the use of strategy in order to secure one’s interests. Another meaning 
implies engaging constructively in a conference, discussing issues and exchanging concessions 
in order to create a deal (March, 1990, p.84).     
Asian negotiators are adept in using cooperative and competitive styles, as both are 
deeply embedded in the different cultural teachings: the cooperative Confucianism and the 
confrontational Taoism and the art of war.  
The joint influence of East and West helped Indians incorporate opposing value 
systems. The cultural blend of Western individualism and achievement, on one hand, and 
eastern collectivism and hierarchical order, on the other hand, shaped a complex Indian 
negotiating style. Indian negotiators, adopting individualistic characteristics, can be aggressive, 
competitive, and achievement oriented. At the same time, operating in a culture of distinct social 
hierarchy, power distance, compliance and expected loyalty, they can be passive and 
agreeable. They are very sensitive to context and adapt well to changing circumstances.     
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5.2. Negotiating with Outsiders 
 
Asians, especially Japanese, in their trusted in-group network, are concerned with harmony and 
do not like to negotiate. Internal negotiations are “on the basis of give and take, harmony and 
long-term interest” (March, 1990, p.15). Given a choice, the Japanese would rather not 
negotiate as the head of a Japanese research institute in negotiation noted: “We Japanese 
really don’t like negotiating at all!” (Cohen, 2002, p.77). Informal contacts between the 
negotiators give them an opportunity to negotiate without negotiating. However, with aggressive 
and arrogant foreign negotiators, the Japanese negotiate defensively and use the kosho, the 
fighting negotiating style (March, 1990). Similarly, the Chinese promote the use of mobile 
warfare when dealing with foreigners. In fact, Chinese managers “are educated to make use of 
the Art of War and The Thirty-Six Stratagems to deal with foreign business people” (Fang, 1999, 
p.180). The authors of Sun Tsu’s art of war and enterprise management write: 
 
In order not to be tricked in dealings with capitalist enterprises and also  
for the purpose of winning business in competition with foreign business 
people and making our products enter into the international markets, we  
need to study Sun Tzu’s Art of War. Use this magic weapon handed down  
from our ancestors to defeat them (Li et al. 1986, p.12). 
      
The historically lingering suspicion of foreigners is the backdrop of negotiations in Asia. 
Recent negative business incidents have reinforced the prevailing sense of distrust. For 
example, promises by Westerners to transfer modern technology to China were purposely 
delayed until a new generation of technology was developed so that the old one would be 
transferred. Foreigners, Asians say, are motivated by cheap labor and short-term financial 
gains. They don’t have a long term-commitment to doing business in Asia. Resentful of another 
foreign exploitation, Asians are determined to prevent the foreigners from “taking advantage of 
the current situation to make money at China’s expense” (Faure, 2000, p.166). They feel 
morally justified in taking revenge and exploiting the exploiters, and “plucking the chickens” -- 
the rich and powerful Western corporations. Asian’s defensive mindset against foreign 
exploitations, naturally lead Asian negotiators to use the value claiming style – the 36 Chinese 
stratagems and the Japanese kosho. 
  
5.3. Relationships 
 
While the Asian-Chinese and the Japanese can easily use the Art of War, the competitive 
mobile warfare, and the kosho value claiming negotiating style with untrustworthy counterparts, 
they can also use the magnanimous and benevolent Confucian joined quest style with 
trustworthy counterparts. In negotiations between China and lower status countries, like Zambia 
and Thailand, Chinese negotiators were cooperative and accommodating (Fang, 1999).   
Relationships: Guanxi and Kankei 
Consistent with the Confucian teaching of promoting harmonious social relationships, 
Asians put a premium on relationships and friendship. They invest in building interpersonal 
connections and in creating a dependable social network of friends and colleagues, known as 
guanxi. In Japan, the concept of guanxi is known as kankei. 
Asians prefer to do business within their own trusted network – with individuals and 
entities that are “known quantities” (Shenkar and Ronen, 1987, p.271). Reputation without 
familiarity is not enough. In the first meeting between two shipping giants, the Greek Aristotle 
Onassis and the Chinese Sir YK Pao, Onassis, moving quickly during the customary exchange 
of pleasantries, proposed to Pao a business joint venture.  Pao was appalled by how a stranger 
could make such an offer (Hutcheon, 1990).  Solid relationships, friendship, and guanxi should 
not be underestimated when one is dealing in Asia.  
Asians put a premium on personal relationships because they provide assurances that 
reduce the risk of doing business. The legal system in Asia does not provide the same 
assurances as the legal system in the West. In China, for example, “the law has been 
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susceptible to manipulation by the authorities and hence provided relatively little protection or 
stability” (Seligman, 1989, p.127).    
To foster relationships, Asians mastered the art of hospitality, flattery, real friendship, 
and sometimes false friendship. In the Chinese and Japanese relationship-focused cultures, 
deals evolve from already established relationships. Deals cannot be made between strangers, 
unless they are introduced through the guanxi network. Because relationships come first, 
Asians will take as long as it is necessary to nourish and establish them before moving to the 
deal. In Asia one has to be a relationship-negotiator. 
  Westerners, in contrast, are contract-focused. They unbundle the business from the 
personal, a separation difficult for the Chinese, for example, to comprehend. For Western 
negotiators, deals emerge first and foremost from shared interests, and relationships might later 
evolve during the negotiation process or post negotiation. This is the contract-negotiator style. 
For the Indians, in contrast to the Chinese and the Japanese, socializing and building 
relationships are much less important at the outset of the negotiation. They focus more on 
building relationships during the negotiations and in that sense they are contract-negotiators.  
While relationships facilitate trust, flexibility, and loyalty, they also create obligations. 
From a Western perspective, relationships in Asia are a double-edged sword because they are 
used to make new demands, reopen contracts, renegotiate already settled terms and demand 
new concessions. Westerners’ refusal to accommodate new demands may well be interpreted 
as unfriendly and would jeopardize the relationships.          
 
5.4. Trust from the Heart 
 
The way members of a social group develop trust and emphasize different trust factors differ 
across cultures. Asians have a strong inclination to trust insiders -- people related to family and 
kinship group (Fukuyama, 1995, p.75) and distrust outsiders because they cannot be dealt with 
in the normal way. In the normal way, interactions among a kinship group carry low risk. If one 
misbehaves, for example, it can be discussed with a brother and a redress can be sought from 
parents. Delicate matters can be handled by a go between uncles. The “insiders” have a shared 
past, a future together, and obligations to fulfill, outsiders do not (Wolf, 1968, p.3).   
Trust in Asia is based on individual trust, cultivated by interpersonal relationships. 
Asians do business with trustworthy individuals and not with the faceless organizations they 
represent. Organizational trust is a Western notion which is foreign to Asians.   
There are two types of trust. Trust from the head or cognitive-based trust, and trust from 
the heart, or affect-based trust (McAllister, 1995; Chua et al. 2009). Westerners tend to trust 
more from the head. They make a cognitive decision to trust based on the person’s 
competency, integrity, sincerity, and reliability. Easterners, in contrast, tend to trust more from 
the heart. A Japanese executive, for example, “…is making gut level judgments about the 
integrity, reliability, commitment….of his American counterpart” (Graham, 1986, p.61).  
Establishing trust from the heart is a long process developed through trust factors like personal 
relationship, openness, mutual help, mutual understanding, and the formation of emotional 
bonds (Tan and Chee, 2005).  
In Asia, trust from the heart influences a wide range of business decisions, including 
appointments and promotion of senior executives. In Taiwan, for example, appointments and 
promotions of general managers and directors to the board in large businesses is based 
primarily on personal trust. Experience and competence, although important, are not sufficient. 
Personal trust is a necessary condition (Kao, 1996).  And in China, “rather than relying on 
objective performance criteria, personnel decisions are made on the basis of the boss’s 
personal relations with his subordinates, even if they are not relatives” (Fukuyama, 1995, p.77). 
Asians, using the family model of relationships as a prototype, are more likely to mix 
between emotional, social, and business elements. The implication, for foreign negotiators, is to 
invest patiently in the natural process of building personal trust from the heart followed by the 
head.  
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5.5. Legal Contracts and the Law 
 
Westerners are accustomed to a long tradition of a strong legal system and to the rule of law. 
Contracts and agreements are viewed as solid legal instruments to be strictly enforced, if 
violated. Among Asian nations, there are significant differences in terms of the level of 
development of the legal system and the rule of law. While Singapore, for example, has a strong 
legal system and strict enforcement of laws, China is still far behind. Not only have Chinese 
private citizens violated intellectual property rights; the Chinese State Statistical Bureau has too. 
It pirated a data management program of a U.S. computer software company. The U.S. firm 
protested and argued that if the government does not respect intellectual property laws, how 
could private citizens be expected to follow the law? The State Statistical Bureau saw the point 
and decided to comply with the law and offered “just $500 for the entire bureau’s national 
network” (Oliver, 1996, p.12).     
Asians have a long tradition of doing business without contracts. Raised with Confucian 
values and a preference for doing business within the trusted guanxi, the in-group network, they 
rely more on sincerity and “face” than on legal contracts.  A verbal commitment is sufficient and 
binding. Asians often feel insulted when their legalistic negotiating counterparts specify in detail 
penalties or remedies for not honoring commitments. Legal contracts are merely a tangible 
expression of something more important - the relationships being created by the parties. 
Contracts are not treated as fixed instruments, simply because one can not foresee all 
circumstances. To reduce risk, Westerners force the future’s eventualities into “what if” by 
“legalizing” them into a long and detailed legal instrument. Life changing circumstances, in the 
Asian tradition, cannot be predicted nor “contained.”  Contracts, therefore, are inherently 
deficient and can never be completely fair because they cannot deal fully with the future. Signed 
contracts are but a representation of current conditions and thus cannot be final. And when 
circumstances change and the existing contract is no longer perceived as a fair deal, it should 
be opened and renegotiated in order to deal with the new circumstances and strike a new and 
fair arrangement between the parties. Asians believe that better than a legal contract is the 
human touch -- good relationships, friendship, trust, flexibility, “face,” and mutual considerations. 
These personal, social and psychological “instruments” deal better with the future and its 
unknowns than legal contracts.   
Confucianism emphasizes moral authority and de-emphasizes legal power. Good 
leaders, for example, rule through their superior moral character and not through the power of 
the law. The law does not provide solutions to problems; people do when they internalize moral 
values and have “face” - a sense of shame.  This doctrine of self and social regulation can 
explain why China did not develop a Western-like legal system. In fact, legalism has been seen 
as coercion and always viewed with distrust.   
The judicial system and the rule of law in Asia are not as advanced as in the West. In 
China, for example, the judicial system has just begun to employ professional people, 
standards, and practices. In the 1980’s it was staffed primarily with military personnel who had 
no legal training and who were primarily loyal to the Party. The judiciary, says Norman Givant, 
the Managing Partner of the Freshfields, Buckhaus and Deringer law office in China, “is still 
problematic and has a long way to go” (Fernandez and Underwood, 2006, p.218). Senior 
executives of multi-national companies who are familiar with the Chinese legal system suggest 
that it should be avoided as a forum of redressing disputes. Gary Dirks of British Petroleum 
China, for example, would rather negotiate disputes out of court than go to court. Charles 
Browne, President of Du Pont China prefers to resolve problems directly with counterparts 
rather than go to court because, he says, “in negotiation you would come out with a result that is 
still better than a court judgment”   (Fernandez and Underwood, 2006, p.218). 
It should be noted, however, that the Chinese legal system has been making a 
substantial effort to improve itself in the past few years. Presently, there are many business 
laws designed to address business issues. But a still sensitive area is the interpretation of these 
laws, which tend to be very broad and vague. When a U.S. electrical goods manufacturer that 
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partnered in a joint venture with a Chinese company wanted to fire a Chinese manager who 
restrained the company from expanding its existing product line in China, the Chinese local 
labor bureau refused to approve it (Oliver, 1996, p.12)    
The evolving legal system and rule of law, the wide variation in the interpretation of laws 
and regulations, and the relaxed enforcement of the laws in China make it a challenge to do 
business in some parts of Asia. A U.S. industrial manufacturer learned this lesson in 1988 in 
China when it partnered with a state-owned Chinese company. Based on a signed contract, the 
US partner committed to buy each year a fixed number of batteries at a fixed price each year. It 
was surprised to get a bill 50 percent higher than expected. After refusing to pay the bill the 
Chinese government confiscated the plant. A year later the American company won its case in 
the international courts but was unable to collect the $8.3 million compensation (Oliver, 1996, 
p.13)    
Foreigners should realize that the legal power of agreements and contracts varies 
between the West and the East and within countries in Asia.  Westerners should restrain their 
instincts to rush to court and litigate and adopt multiple ways for managing disputes. Resolving 
disputes the “local way” of informal influence and mediation behind the scene is most often the 
most effective way.  
 
5.6. Concept of Fairness 
  
In the West, economic fairness is based on equity (proportionality) and equal reciprocity. Parties 
that invest more resources in a venture are entitled to a greater share of the pie, and when they 
exchange concessions, they expect that the exchange will be roughly equal, value for value.   
In Asia fairness is perceived differently. When Thailand wanted to sell rice to China as 
an economic favor, China agreed. Describing the negotiation with the accommodating Chinese, 
a Thai negotiator commented: “…in our tradition the less powerful party is not expected to be as 
generous as the more powerful one” (Blackman, 1997, p.26). Fairness in the Asian tradition is 
contextual and is based on needs. It is measured by the economic conditions of the company 
with whom you negotiate, which party has more resources, and which party is in a greater need. 
Fairness based on needs implies that negotiators representing wealthy foreign corporations are 
expected to be generous with their local and needy partners. To not act generously is to not be 
a good friend, as friends always help each other.  However, in order to preserve “face” the 
appearance of symmetry and equality must be maintained.  
 
5.7. Risk Behavior 
 
“He who does nothing makes no mistakes,” is one of the central rules of the Chinese 
bureaucracy. Asians do not behave as autonomous negotiators, especially when it comes to 
taking risks and assuming personal responsibility. For Asians, not to act is rational because the 
rewards for negotiating successfully, as Fang (1999) argues, are minimal, whereas the penalties 
for making mistakes are great. That makes Asians risk averse. To minimize risks they tend to 
make decisions based on carefully evaluating a large amount of information. A Chinese buyer 
will spend an enormous amount of time collecting information on product technology and 
performance, making the purchase process long. This tendency to “play it safe” often hinders 
the introduction of creative, bold, and risky ideas. When dealing with Asian negotiators, 
especially Japanese, moving forward patiently and making incremental progress, generally is 
more productive. 
While Chinese and Japanese are risk averse, Indians, like Westerners, see risk as 
something that should be managed wisely rather than avoided.   
 
5.8. Concept of “Face”  
 
“Face,” or human dignity, is gained when individuals behave morally, have prestige associated 
with accomplishments, and most importantly, show genuine concern for the collective’s interests 
– family, social network, and the community. “Face” is a formidable social control mechanism – 
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rewarding people with prestige when they respond positively to social expectations and 
punishing them with a loss of “face” when they do not.  
The concept of “face” is common to all societies but most salient in the Asian culture. It 
is rooted in the Confucian philosophy of social harmony. A social group maintains inter-personal 
and social harmony when individuals restrain their aggressive instincts and do not confront each 
other directly, nor mention difficulties. An employee, for example, would refrain from raising 
concerns with a superior because “Troubling the boss can be considered rude and would likely 
be seen as admission that the manager was to some degree responsible for the problem” 
(Fernandez & Underwood, 2006, p.83). Consequently, problems and difficulties are dealt with 
only when they can no longer be avoided. Postponed difficulties and avoided conflicts usually 
become more acute at a later stage.       
The Western’s style of conflict management tends to be open and direct. It is indeed 
challenging for foreigners to communicate effectively and manage difficulties and, at the same 
time, preserve their counterparts’ “face” because “if you let somebody lose ‘face,’ it will be very 
difficult to rebuild a trusting relationship,” says Jun Tang, the president of Microsoft China 
(Fernandez and Underwood, 2006, p.84). 
 Much of Asians’ inactions and actions are related to protecting against losing “face” or 
to gaining “face.” On the inaction side, Asian negotiators, for example, are uncomfortable about 
expressing direct opinions because they do not want to run the risk of disrespecting or even 
offending their chief negotiator. On the action side, Asian negotiators are relentless in their 
conquest for concessions. They are motivated by the desire to look good and have a better 
“face” (Schnepp, et al. 1990, p.148).  The better the deal the more “face” they obtain.   
 
5.9. Time Perspective, Pace, and Synchronization 
 
When Jeanne Kirkpatrick, then American ambassador to the United Nations, asked the foreign 
ministers of the six ASEAN countries if there were good prospects for settling the Cambodian 
conflict, they all said, “Yes.” And when she asked: “Do you think it will be very soon?” they all 
said, “Oh yes, very soon.”  “Well, how soon?” she wanted to know. “Oh, about five years’ time,” 
they said. She was shocked. Five years for an American is certainly not soon (Koh, 1996, 
p.316), but is for Easterners. The Asians’ sense of time was perhaps best expressed by the 
former Chinese Premier, Mao Zedong. When a journalist asked him to comment on the French 
revolution of 1789, he said that it is too early to comment on it (Faure, 1998, p.145). 
The short time perspective of Westerners clearly stands in contrast to the Easterners’ 
time perspective. When the University of New South Wales (UNSW), an Australian university, 
opened its Singapore campus in May 2007, many were optimistic. But only a few months later, 
UNSW announced that the campus would be closed immediately. It pulled out of Singapore 
because it was able to recruit only 148 applicants, short of the projected 300 for the first 
semester. This decision reinforced the common perception of foreign entities’ short-term mind-
set lacking the Confucian virtue of persistence and tenacity that Saburo Matsuo, a Japanese 
salesman of a major securities company demonstrated. Matsuo, interested in the business of 
one of Japan’s richest man, stood in front of his house and bowed to him for six months, six 
mornings a week, but he was ignored by the rich man. One morning, however, Matsuo was 
caught in a heavy downpour without an umbrella, and the famous rich man invited him to get 
into his car. There they had their first conversation about the stock market. Matsuo’s patience 
and persistence impressed the rich man who became a new client (March, 1990, p.18). Asia is 
a long-term investment that requires patience, persistence, and tenacity.   
Short or long-term orientations influence the pace – how fast or slow -- negotiations 
move. For many Western negotiators, the pace of negotiating with Asians is painfully slow. 
Asians believe that a negotiator should be calm, and move slowly. To lose your serenity and to 
negotiate anxiously under time pressure is to put yourself unwisely at a psychological 
disadvantage. Even when Asian negotiators have an interest in expediting the negotiation 
process, they will project an attitude of not being in a hurry. They understand the strategic value 
of time and are mindful of controlling the pace of the negotiation. They slow it or hasten it 
according to their interests.  
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The slow pace of the negotiations in Asia can be attributed to several factors. First is 
the general belief that a negotiator cannot maximize the benefits in a quick negotiation. 
Because negotiation, as many believe, is a war of attrition where resilience and patience are 
tested, one must be patient.  Second is the management of impression. To conclude the deal 
quickly may be seen by the negotiator’s superiors as “premature” and as if the negotiator did not 
try hard enough to maximize gains. Third is the symbolic “game of time.” To move forward 
quickly signals anxiety and weakness. It sends a clear message that you need the deal more. 
Not to appear eager and weak, Asians play the “game of time.” Fourth is risk aversion. Asian 
negotiators refrain from taking personal responsibility and constantly go back and forth to 
consult with their superiors. The fifth reason that explains the slow pace of negotiating with 
Asians is the nature of their decision making process. To maintain harmony, diffuse risks, and 
save face, Asians, especially Japanese, employ a consensus decision-making process. 
The pace of the negotiation influences the degree to which negotiators are 
synchronized. Effective negotiators find a way to mutually adjust their pace and synchronize it – 
moving together at the same pace. Often, however, Western and Asian negotiators move at 
different paces and consequently find themselves not synchronized. In the first phase of the 
preliminaries -- small talks and building relationships -- Westerners are brief. After 10 minutes of 
chit chat they jump into the task of give and take. For Asians, the long preliminary phase is 
perhaps the most critical.  It is made of social entertainment, ceremonies, and the exchange of 
gifts (Graham, 1986). In the second phase of the actual negotiation – give and take --, 
Westerners are also brief. Asians are interested first and foremost in fully understanding the 
negotiation context and ask many clarifying questions. When the Americans and Japanese 
negotiate, for example, after the Americans state their positions, “…the Japanese tendency is to 
listen quite carefully, to ask for additional details, and to say nothing at all committal. This lack of 
response is likely to frustrate the American side, which wants a counter-proposal put on the 
table so that give-and-take can begin” (Cohen, 2002, p.85).  Westerners ask a few questions 
and move quickly to persuading and making concessions quite early in the negotiation process. 
The Japanese make concessions only at the very end of the negotiation. In the final stage – the 
closing of the deal --, Western negotiators who typically have authority to seal the deal, move 
quickly and finalize it. Asian negotiators, in contrast, move also very slowly in the deal closing 
stage. They, in general, have limited authority to seal the deal themselves and thus have to take 
the proposed deal to their superiors for approval.    
The negotiating process with Indians is also slow and long for several reasons. First, 
they do not work well in teams. Thus, it takes a long time to sort out different perspectives and 
disagreements. Second, Indian negotiators diligently collect a lot of information and analyze it 
carefully in order to ensure that they get the best possible deal. They are constantly looking for 
a better deal. Third, the efficiency of the negotiation process is much less important than the 
final outcome. Therefore, to get the best possible deal, like the Chinese and Japanese, they use 
the drawn out war of attrition designed to “exhaust” the counterparts to concede to more 
demands.  
 
5.10. Emotions 
 
All negotiations have some degree of inherent ambiguity. Negotiators, therefore, engage in 
sense making activities by looking for clues and visible signs that will help them diffuse the 
uncertainty. One of the ways is to look at their counterpart’s display of emotions. The Confucian 
teaching of xinping qihe – “being perfectly calm” (Shenkar and Ronen, 1987, p.267) makes this 
very difficult for Westerners. Confucianism promotes the notion that a cultivated person must 
exercise self-control and restrain selfish urges to display emotions, especially in public, because 
it threatens harmony. Asians, suspicious of strong emotional displays, distrust individuals who 
cannot contain their emotions and display aggressive behavior.  
Asians, trained to project calm and minimize emotional displays, add another layer of 
uncertainty to the already ambiguous negotiation situation. Westerners, in contrast, tend to be 
animated and openly display soft and raw emotions.  Western negotiators may want to tone it 
down and disengage from the urge to make sense of their Asian counterparts’ emotional state 
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because doing so is challenging. However, it is this challenge that justifies the use of 
multicultural interpreters who may be more capable of making sense of the invisible aspects of 
the behaviors of negotiators from different cultures.  
 
5.11. Decisions 
 
Making decisions can range from a top-down style where a single authority makes the decision 
to a consensus decision making style where all the members of a group make the decision 
together. The Chinese and the Japanese use the consensus decision making style. Although 
these societies are hierarchical, leaders refrain from dictating a decision in order to preserve the 
harmonious relationships and give “face” to others. In Japan, for example, the practice of 
Nemawashi – binding up the roots of the tree prior to its being transplanted – is a decision 
making process that allows people to express ideas before a formal proposal is drawn (March, 
1990, p.27). In this long and slow process, leaders and followers exert caution and 
consideration ensuring that all reservations and disagreements are ironed out before the final 
decision is made.  
The consensus decision making process allows individuals to diffuse risks and be 
shielded from taking personal responsibility. The Western’s notion that an authorized person in 
the negotiation room will make a quick decision is wishful thinking. Quite often influential 
decision makers are not even at the table. They may appear when there is a good prospect of 
closing the deal.     
In India, unlike China and Japan, decisions most often are top-down and made by the 
higher authority. This is the norm. Indian subordinates expect the higher authority to make the 
decision and will not question it even when they disagree with their superiors. Compliance and 
loyalty are expected. In this respect, the speed of decisions in India can be faster than in Japan 
and China, provided, the Indian bureaucracy is neither needed nor involved in making the deal.   
 
5.12. Teamwork  
 
Asian Chinese, contrary to Westerners and Indians, are excellent team players. They recognize 
that success comes from compliance and contribution to the collective effort. Japanese 
negotiators, so concerned with loyalty to the collective’s interests, often reassure their 
colleagues that their private interests will not compromise the team’s interests.    
Asian negotiators form well integrated and cohesive teams with clear roles and 
responsibilities. The spokesperson, most often, is not the higher authority decision maker. The 
ability of the teams to stay united and work well together is perhaps the greatest strength they 
bring to the table in team negotiations. It would be unwise and futile to try to split Asian teams. 
Their loyalty to the team is paramount and supersedes any potential individual gains they might 
get in the future.      
While Chinese and Japanese are good team players, Indian negotiators do not work 
well together. The typical Indian’s self concept is “I am superior and right” and thus the other 
person is wrong. The team, for an Indian, is to serve him or her and respond to his or her own 
interests. When an Indian team is leaderless and the authority is not well defined, Indians resort 
to extreme individualism and counter conformism, giving freedom to their full selves.    
Westerners have often underestimated the power of the Chinese and the Japanese 
team unity and loyalty and tried, however unsuccessfully, to create a split among the team’s 
members. Not only will such a move rarely, if ever, succeed; it can lead to a deep sense of 
mistrust. In contrast, the Indians’ difficulties in creating team unity may dispose them to splitting 
and forming a coalition with counterpart negotiators.    
 
6. The Art of War: Mobile Warfare 
 
Asian negotiators had been trained in the Art of War for many centuries. It may be useful also 
for Western negotiators to read the Art of War and the 36 Chinese stratagems (Fang, 1999, 
pp.289-304) and identify the stratagems that their counterparts might use. The more Western 
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negotiators are familiar with the Chinese stratagems, the better they can cope with them and 
hopefully transform the negotiation from a mobile warfare to a joint quest. Here are some of the 
common Chinese stratagems. 
Hide a knife behind a smile: Charm and ingratiate yourself to your adversaries. Once 
you have gained their trust, move secretly and attack them.    
Kill with a borrowed knife: Asian negotiators use external resources to their 
advantage. For example, they will use a competitor’s proposals to play the competition against 
each other. Confidential proposals from one competitor are shown to another in order to extract 
better terms. Often negotiations are handled simultaneously with several competitors despite 
promises to the contrary (Seligman, 1989, p.144).   
 
Killing the chicken to warn the monkey: Asian negotiators, in general, are not high 
risk takers. To establish their “high” risk attitude and credibility, they may make a threat on a 
minor issue in order to establish the credibility of their future threats on larger issues. Killing the 
chicken is “a warning shot” (Faure, 1998, p.141). 
 
Sweet and sour: Asian negotiators like to create a psychological dissonance by 
changing approaches from the sweet and friendly to the sour and cold. Sometimes the 
negotiation team will take assigned roles – some sweet and others sour (Pye, 1982).  This is the 
classic good cop, bad cop.   
 
Shaming and guilt: Although “face” in Asia is an important civil value and people go to 
a great length to refrain from causing others to lose face, some Asian negotiators do not 
hesitate to use this taboo against strangers. Asian negotiators have a long memory and to instill 
a feeling of guilt (Seligman, 1989) sometimes go 200 years back – to colonial and imperialist 
times – to remind their counterparts of misdeeds made by their countries. The shaming may 
come together with a display of anger and “drama” – like storming out of the negotiating room.    
 
Lure the tiger to leave the mountain: Asians like to control the location of the 
negotiation so that they can be the hosts and not the guests who come to China asking for 
favors from the Court of the Emperor. The home court advantage is both psychological and 
physical. Whereas Asians are in their natural environment, not pressed by artificial deadlines 
and spared of travel expenses, foreign negotiators are cut off from their headquarters, their 
families, and under a deadline pressure to conclude a deal. By controlling the ground, Asians 
can also control the schedule and control the timing (Fang, 1999) – slowing the negotiation 
process by organizing sightseeing tours or engaging in lengthy consultations while the 
counterparts are “on hold.” To establish the principle of reciprocity, foreign negotiators may want 
to schedule some of the negotiations outside Asia, in their own home court.   
 
Await leisurely the exhausted enemy: Asian negotiators understand well the value of 
resources. While they relax and preserve their own resources, they wage a war of attrition to 
frustrate and deplete the counterpart psychologically and physically. For example, the Chinese 
insist that “disputes be arbitrated in Beijing before the Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission” (Chang, 1987), or that contracts will be according to the Chinese law and written 
in Chinese only.        
 
Create something of nothing: Take trivial issues and blow them up out of proportion. 
Gain advantage by conjuring illusions (Fang, 1999, p.291). Even when quality or prices are 
reasonable, blow them up – “the price is very high” or the “quality is very low.”   
 
Giving away a brick to earn a piece of jade:  This involves capitalizing on the foreign 
negotiators ignorance and trading something of a low value for something of a high value.  
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7. Suggestions for Negotiating Successfully in Asia 
 
Successful cross-border deal-making begins with understanding the deep cultural values that 
drive behavior. Negotiators should be culturally informed and sensitive. However, it should be 
noted that cultural understanding and sensitivity are not enough. Equally important is strategic 
advantage. Those who go to Asia as takers may not fare well if they do not have much to offer. 
Those who go to Asia as givers and have something to offer – new technologies, new products, 
or new mutually beneficial opportunities – will fare well. Here are some suggestions that may 
facilitate successful negotiations in Asia.  
 
 
Present a long-term vision: The Asian time perspective is historical. Asian negotiators 
appreciate perseverance and long term commitment based on trusted relationships that are built 
slowly and over time. Assure your counterparts that your “Asia play” is a long term play because 
Asians distrust quick deals. You should present a vision based on shared interests first, not just 
benefits.   
 
Build strong relationships and trust:  Business in Asia is based on personal 
relationships and trust from the heart. Use skilled negotiators who know how to form emotional 
bonds and develop trust from the heart as well as the head. Emphasize first personal 
relationships and friendship, openness, and understanding and help. Use trusted intermediaries 
to introduce you and facilitate the process of building relationships and trust. They can play an 
important informal role behind the scene.   
 
Mobile warfare and joint quest:  Asian negotiators are contextual and use both 
cooperative and competitive negotiating styles. Foreign negotiators should not be trapped in the 
aggressive mobile warfare. To promote the likelihood that the constructive joint quest 
negotiating style will be used, proceed with the negotiation after you have established good 
relationships and some degree of trust. 
 
Wide repertoire of behaviors: To succeed in Asia, one must have a wide range of 
skills, attitudes, and behaviors. In a culture that tests resiliency and competes fiercely for 
resources, you have to be a warrior.  In a culture that promotes harmony, you have to be a 
peacemaker. In a culture where time is plentiful and urgency is a weakness, you have to be a 
monk.  In a culture that values symbols, rituals, and tradition, you must be civilized.  In a culture 
that emphasizes hierarchical social relationships, you have to be respectfully differential. In a 
culture that emphasizes human sincerity and human touch, you ought not to act too legally.    
 
Deemphasize legalism: Relationships and trust between negotiators are much more 
important than just legal agreements. Do not overemphasize legalism by articulating countless 
contingencies and “what ifs.” Good relationships are a better mean of taking care of any 
unforeseen future difficulties.   
 
Use cultural boundary spanners:  Western negotiators should study the Asian culture 
and understand it well. However, it is not possible to fully understand all the cultural subtle 
nuances. Therefore, Western negotiators would benefit from the expertise and advice of 
culturally informed experts who are more capable of interpreting the subtleties of a given 
culture.    
 
Practice patience: Because Asians distrust quick deals, expect deliberate delays and 
sometimes break offs. They are designed to test your resolve. Do not restrain yourself by setting 
an inflexible deadline because time urgency in Asia is interpreted as a weakness. Even when 
you are under time pressure, do what Asians do: Be calm and project the allure that time is not 
of the essence. A prolonged negotiation process is normal, and when it seems that there is no 
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progress, there is, in fact, progress. In the Asian’s thinking, no movement is part of movement. 
When it seems that nothing is happening for a period of time, resist the temptation to push too 
hard forward. Things will move forward when the other side is ripe and willing to move.  
 
Know and commit to your objectives and bottom line: Asian negotiators often play 
the competitors off each other and use the long war of attrition to erode your objectives, the 
things you must get from the deal. Your commitment to your objectives and bottom line is 
critically important, especially in Asia. Focus like a laser beam on what you must get from the 
deal and do not let deadlines, psychological pressure, and fatigue, erode your core interests.   
 
Master the substance and the protocol: Asians prepare meticulously, master well the 
substantive issues, and engage in continuous due-diligence. The Japanese, for example, “ask 
thousands of questions” (Graham, 1986 p.62) and often repeat the same questions in order to 
fully understand the full context of the negotiation. Be prepared to answer a lot of questions. In 
addition, recognize that Asian negotiators take detailed notes of everything and will use them to 
exploit advantages. Do the same: take meticulous notes and use the record to your advantage. 
Always clarify the issues and record mutual understandings in great specificity, leaving minimal 
room for misconstruing the issues.   
    
On-going negotiation: Whereas in the west a done deal is a done deal, in Asia deals 
are never done and are often opened and renegotiated when the circumstances change. 
Therefore, leave room for giving future concessions. Don’t deplete your bank of concessions. 
 
Be humble and fair: Asians dislike foreign negotiators who are arrogant and display 
their superiority in different areas (e.g., science, technology, or management). Be humble about 
what you know and be humbled by what you don’t know. Try to create mutually beneficial and 
fair deals.      
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